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In the field of firm demography, spin-offs have recently attracted attention as a very 
successful form of new firm formation. Policy makers see spin-offs as particularly fertile 
innovators in an economy. Theoretically, following lines of thought from the resource-
based theory, spin-offs are also expected to perform better than other start-ups that lack the 
resource base spin-offs inherited from their mother companies. This paper shows, based on 
an empirical study of American entrepreneurs (ERC-dataset) that spin-offs are indeed a step 
ahead of firms that do not receive support from a third party company. In the early stages of 
their existence, spin-offs are leading other new firms in the development of their products, 
spin-offs show an increased tendency to hire personnel, and spin-offs receive their first 
income sooner than other firms. At start-up, spin-outs hardly differ from individual start-
ups, which have not received any back-up during the gestation process. After one year they 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Both spin-offs and start-ups have received ample attention in the literature on new firm 
formation. Start-ups in general have been investigated in depth from the 1980s on (see 
Storey, 1982; Wever, 1984). The idea of Schumpeter that new firms are good for 
economies and innovation was picked up and a need emerged to get more insight in the 
processes influencing new firm formation. The new firm formation processes of individual 
firms appear to be very heterogeneous and this is reflected in the characteristics of the new 
firms. Once this was recognised, several divisions of new firm formation have been 
proposed. Westhead (1998), for example, made a distinction between novice entrepreneurs 
and more experienced entrepreneurs (habitual / serial entrepreneurs). He showed that, in 
general, new firms of experienced entrepreneurs performed better. Focussing on the 
gestation process in a similar vein, several studies have identified spin-offs as a specific 
group of new firm formation (Bernardt et al., 2002; Moncada-Paternò-Castello et al., 2000; 
Agarwal et al., 2003; Garnsey, 1998). Spin-offs are not necessarily new firms of 
experienced businessmen, but the entrepreneurs do take resources from existing companies 
which they deploy in their own company. Spin-offs have drawn attention as a very 
successful group of new firms and have been studied accordingly. However, mainly due to 
a lack of suitable data, they have hardly been compared to other forms of new firm 
formation, such as individual start-ups. This paper tries to close this gap and addresses the 
differences between the two groups, focussing on the gestation processes of the firms and 
their performance during start-up and one year later. The empirical basis of the comparison 
lies in the vast ERC dataset
1 from the U.S.A.. This dataset allows a distinction between 
start-ups and spin-offs and this makes it possible to compare both groups in a systematic 
way for a large number of cases. 
The paper addresses the theoretical background to the problem in section 2. The dataset 
and the techniques used are described in detail in section 3 and the results are presented in 
section 4. Section 5 concludes. 
 
                                                         







Paper Porto 3.2 - longitudinaal 
2. THEORY
2 
In this paper, the firm is viewed upon from a resource-based point of view, because ‘The 
value of any economic organisation (firm, business, company) derives from and reflects the 
value … of the resources under its control…’ (Lewin & Phelan, 2000). Looking at the firm 
in this particular way is insightful in the present context for two reasons. Firstly, the 
resource-base theory allows for the idea that new firms can partly be regarded as re-
arrangements of existing resources or assets. Spin-offs can be seen as new entities 
managing existing resources originating from a mother company, whereas the resources of 
individual start-ups originate from elsewhere. Secondly, the resource-based theory of the 
firm accommodates a causal relation between the quantity and quality of the resources 
available and the performance of a company. 
2.1  Resources and gestation of the firm 
Firms have both tangible and intangible resources. Physical assets such as capital, 
buildings, and codified knowledge are tangible. Examples of intangible assets are 
organisational routines, human resources, and tacit knowledge. Especially intangible assets 
are hard to control and it is inevitable that firms spill-over part of these assets, either to the 
business environment or to their employees. In a sense, companies educate their employees. 
Employees accumulate knowledge about the production process, the sector, and the 
network of providers and customers of a company. Tacit knowledge about the operation of 
the market and the company, which has been acquired by the employee, can be used as 
input for a new firm. This knowledge is sector-specific and is hardly useful outside the 
boundaries of a sector. Extensive knowledge of production processes and networks in the 
software sector is irrelevant when setting up a new firm in the automobile sector. When an 
employee utilises sector-specific knowledge in a new founding, resources of the mother 
company are unintentionally shared with the newly developed firm. An extreme case is the 
commercial exploitation outside the company of an innovation done by an employee 
(Anton & Yao, 1995). It is therefore not surprising that firms go through great lengths to 
avoid these knowledge leakages. In some knowledge intensive industries it is not 
uncommon for employees to sign a contract in which they state that knowledge will not be 
used outside of the firm. The effect of resource sharing on new firm formation has been 
documented in some studies. Bais (1999), for example, finds that most Dutch entrepreneurs 
                                                         









    Paper Porto 3.2 - longitudinaal 
SPIN-OFF FIRMS AND INDIVIDUAL START-UPS 
 
have working experience in the same sector, which suggests that sector-specific knowledge 
is used in setting up these new firms. 
Especially in smaller firms, an additional resource-sharing effect, which is related to 
general management skills, can be noticed. This type of resource sharing can be typified as 
“general learning” (Becker, 1964). Employees of small firms normally execute less 
specialised tasks than their large-firm colleagues, who are mainly concerned with one 
specialised task. As a result, employees in small firms are not only educated in a sector-
specific way, but they also gain insight into the managerial issues involved in running a 
business. These employees are, in a way, trained to run their own business, irrespective of 
the sector of the new company. The knowledge acquired can be deployed in every business 
setting. If employees of small companies indeed experience learning effects of both kinds, 
this should result in a higher propensity to entrepreneurship, compared to individuals with 
working experience in larger firms. Several studies support this hypothesis by finding that 
employees of small firms have relatively good chances of starting a new firm (see for 
example Garofoli, 1994). General knowledge of entrepreneurship can be deployed in every 
new firm and is of great benefit to potential entrepreneurs. However, because of its general 
applicability, it is ruled out as a distinguishing factor for spin-offs. Spin-offs are by 
definition based on sector specific knowledge (Koster & Wissen, 2003 forthcoming; 
Bernardt et al., 2002; Klepper, 2001a). 
Resources are not only shared unintentionally. In some cases the mother company 
deliberately helps creating a new firm as part of the business strategy. New firms can offer 
several benefits to the existing firm. Firstly, a new firm can serve as a breeding ground for 
new ideas and innovations that are hard to establish within the existing firm. Especially 
large firms are inclined to support low-risk, capital-intensive innovations because of their 
extensive bureaucratic backbone (Bhidé, 2000). This inclination could hamper innovative 
progress. New, small, and above all innovative firms can fill this gap, as has been theorised 
by Teece (1998). Secondly, a new firm can evolve into a solid business partner that 
provides services to the mother company based on the specific knowledge of this company. 
New firms partly based on resources of the mother company are better equipped to identify 
the wishes and needs of the mother company and act accordingly. A fine supplier or 
customer can be gained. 
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  Figure 2.1 identifies four possible forms of new firm formation, using the dimensions 
‘resource sharing’ and ‘parental support’, as introduced in the above. Individual start-ups 
are based on resources that mainly originate from the entrepreneur, the individual. Spin-
outs do use resources built up in other firms, but the gestation of these firms is not directly 
supported by the mother company. Like spin-outs, Spin-offs and corporate spin-offs are 
built on existing resources, and on top of that, during the gestation phase they are supported 
by a mother company. Support is a continuous term, as there are many levels of support. 
Organisational spin-offs are totally set-up by the mother company and are usually the result 
of a reorganisation. 
2.2 Resources  and  performance 
The seminal writing on resource-based views of the firm is by Penrose (1959). In this book, 
she links the availability of resources directly to growth of firms. She shows that “the 
resources with which a particular firm is accustomed to working will shape the productive 
services the management is capable of rendering (p. 5)”. The statement shows that 
although resources are important, management is also pivotal for a successful firm. The 
performance of a firm not only depends on the availability of resources, but also on the way 
management is able to mobilise and combine its resources for the production process 
(Agarwal et al., 2003). Kogut and Zander (1992) argue that innovation and progress result 
from both the acquisition of assets and the new combination of available assets. A good 
example of the impact of management on the availability of resources is described by 
Appold (2001). He shows that the management of available knowledge and skills directly 
Figure 2.1: firm-founding types 
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influences the motivation and satisfaction of employees. Continuous mismanagement can 
lead to a situation in which employees do not function well and they could eventually even 
leave the firm. This will compromise the availability and quality of the resources used for 
production. Therefore, both the availability of resources and the management are important 
factors to explain success of a company. 
Based on the availability of resources at start-up, it can be expected, that both spin-outs 
and spin-offs outperform individual start-ups. Both new founding types have superior 
access to existing resources due to their, either direct or indirect, connection with other 
firms in the field (Garnsey, 1998). By definition, spin-out entrepreneurs have set up a firm 
with specific knowledge of a product and spin-offs even have a third party beneficiary, 
guaranteeing a solid basis to build the firm upon. 
As for management skills, spin-out and spin-off entrepreneurs as such are not expected 
to be superior over other entrepreneurs. Management skills are personal characteristics and 
each entrepreneur develops these skills over years. However, as mentioned before, 
entrepreneurs who worked for small firms are likely to have better management skills. 
Their tasks are likely to have been diverse and this has given them an understanding of the 
whole firm, rather than a specialised part of it. In the sample of this study, previously 
unemployed entrepreneurs are labelled ‘individual start-up’, which on average could give a 
small advantage in terms of management skills for spin-outs and spin-off entrepreneurs 
who were all employed beforehand.  
However, it is likely that the availability of resources is more important for the new 
firms in the data set than management skills. The firms are so young that they mainly 
consist of the assets they were started with. Entrepreneurs with above-average management 
capabilities have not yet had the time to improve the resource base of the firms and 
consequently their performance. Differences in the level of management skills would 
therefore not show in the results yet. In this study, the management skills are assumed equal 
and are not part of the analysis. Studies following cohorts of young firms, bearing in mind 
the different resource bases they have, should explicitly address the management 
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3. DATA 
Most studies on spin-offs take the form of case studies of a firm or a region, typically an 
economic cluster. In these case studies the linkages between companies and its offspring 
are monitored and conclusions are drawn on the gestation of an economic cluster (see for 
example Klepper, 2001b; Dahl et al., 2003). The absence of suitable datasets causes the 
lack of comparative studies on a higher regional scale. This study is based on the large ERC 
dataset, which is suitable for the purpose of comparing spin-offs to other start-up groups. 
3.1 ERC
3 
The ERC dataset is the result of a large study of individuals in the United States with the 
goal to unravel their entrepreneurial activities in detail. The goal of the endeavour is hardly 
unique, as there have been many studies about the motives, actions and goals of 
entrepreneurs. However, the combined efforts of the participating universities and research 
institutes resulted in a large and longitudinal dataset, which is unprecedented. The dataset 
contains comprehensive information on nascent entrepreneurs, their backgrounds, goals, 
expectations, and resources. The dataset includes precise information about the gestation 
process of new firms and the role of other actors in this process. This makes it possible to 
identify spin-offs, spin-outs, and individual start-ups. Unfortunately, the dataset lacks cases 
of corporate spin-offs. These start-ups are assumed to be totally instigated by already 
existing firms and therefore this group has been filtered out from the research population. 
Consequently, the conclusions in this paper apply only to entrepreneurial spin-offs. The 
focus on individuals should be borne in mind when interpreting the results. The results 
apply to individuals that are in the process of setting up a new business. Not the firm itself 
is the unit of study but the entrepreneur working on it. However, especially in the early 
stages of development of a firm, owner and firm are very closely related (Stam, 2003). 
Besides, many variables in the questionnaire, directly relate to the firm and not the 
entrepreneur. Especially performance and development indicators, which are used in the 
present study, relate to the firm rather than to the entrepreneur. 
  The new firm formation groups (Figure 2.1) are defined on the basis of the dimensions 
‘resource sharing’ and ‘outside help’. Several questions in the survey relate to these 
dimensions and were used to identify the founding groups. Spin-outs entrepreneurs, for 
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example, indicated that during the gestation process no outside influence was experienced, 
but that the firm is a result of specific knowledge the entrepreneur acquired earlier in a job. 
In a similar vein, individual start-ups and spin-offs could be distinguished, as is explained 
in detail in Appendix 1. Unfortunately, part of the cases could not be categorised because of 
missing values. This group consists of individual entrepreneurs with previous experience in 
jobs. It is unclear, though, whether their firms are based on specific knowledge of a 
product, which would make them spin-out entrepreneurs. It is therefore not possible to 
make the distinction between individual start-ups and spin-outs for this group. This mixed 
group of entrepreneurs is designated as SU/SO (Start-up / Spin-out). 
The ERC-study has been organised in four steps, or waves. The first step deals with the 
determination of the research population, which consists of nascent entrepreneurs and a 
control group. In this phase entrepreneurs involved in corporate spin-offs, for example, 
were identified and filtered out. About 64500 U.S. citizens were randomly selected and 
their entrepreneurial behaviour surveyed. A group of 1250 individuals was selected, of 
whom 850 were nascent entrepreneurs. The remaining 400 serve as control group. The 
identified population has been studied in three questionnaire-waves. The first wave was 
carried out in 1998-1999, the follow-ups one and two years later. This method secures a 
longitudinal knowledge of the entrepreneurial actions of the population. Table 3.1 
summarises the sizes of the four waves. 
 
Wave Population  (N) 
Screener - survey  64622 
Wave I  1261 
Wave II  1261 
Wave III  1261 
Table 3.1: data-set description (based on the codebook) 
 
As most longitudinal studies, this particular study experienced quite a substantial 
amount of attrition in the dataset. A significant number of respondents have no records in 
the second and third wave of the study. Especially individuals with a failing entrepreneurial 
endeavour are expected to drop from the participants list, as the respondents are more likely 
to talk about success than about the failure of their firm. The survey therefore probably 
shows a bias in the latter waves towards successful start-up attempts. Table 3.2 gives an 
idea of the loss with the passing of time. Exact figures are not available, as they are not 
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together. The codebook gives some insight in the development of the number of 
participants. Note that the number of system-missing cases differs slightly from variable to 
variable in the last two questionnaire-waves. This paper uses data from the first two waves. 
Detailed information on the project can be found in the guide to the dataset (Reynolds, 
2000). 
 Respondents  Control  group  Attrition  Total 
Wave I  830 333  98  1261 
Wave II  ± 300  333  ± 625  1261 
Wave III  ± 300  333  ± 625  1261 




In the remainder of the paper, firms from the four founding groups are compared. On the 
one hand, the abilities to successfully end the start-up phase are assessed. On the other 
hand, the performance of the firms are also regarded. Spin-offs are expected to score better 
on each of these dimensions because of their superior resources and knowledge of the 
relevant networks. The set-up of the dataset allows the monitoring of new firms in the first 
year of their existence. The first wave identifies the characteristics of the new firm when 
they are on the verge of entering business. The entrepreneurs might have taken care of 
many things already, but the firm has not been developed totally (Reynolds, 2000). In the 
second wave, the situation one year later is examined. Before turning to the start-up success 
and performance of the firms, I present the sizes of the four founding groups. 
4.1 Group  sizes 
Table 4.1 shows the break-down of the entrepreneurs into the four start-up groups, 
individual start-ups, spin-outs, spin-offs and the awkward mixed group. The table shows 
the shares of the groups for both the first and the second wave of the questionnaire. It is 
clear that spin-offs (corporate spin-offs excluded) form the smallest group. Every eighth 
entrepreneur felt that the gestation process of the new business was influenced by another 
firm. The rest of all new start-ups can be considered the endeavour of an individual or a 
group of individuals. It is important to notice, however, that just over 20% of all new firms 
                                                         
4 All figures presented have been based on weighted variables. The ERC dataset shows, as a result of 
the design of the study, an overrepresentation of female entrepreneurs and entrepreneurs of ethnic 










    Paper Porto 3.2 - longitudinaal 
SPIN-OFF FIRMS AND INDIVIDUAL START-UPS 
 
are based on specific knowledge of the entrepreneur (spin-outs). These new firms are in an 
indirect way also related to existing firms. The specific knowledge and experience, on 
which firms are based, were collected in existing firms. For spin-outs, existing firms are 
one of the sources of the assets the entrepreneur uses to start the new firm. About 35% of 
all new firms seem to be related to existing firms and this justifies the recent increase of 
studies concerning spin-offs. In the second wave, the combined groups of spin-offs and 
spin-outs have an even larger impact. After one year 43% of the interviewed firms are firm-
influenced foundings. The higher share seems to be partially caused by a great drop in the 
share of the mixed group. Although it is hard to give a solid explanation for this 
phenomenon, it may be a relic of the questionnaire. Poorly filled out questionnaires, which 
leads to a placement in the mixed group, could be a sign of indifference towards the ERC-
study. Members of this groups are therefore more likely to disappear in the following 
waves. It could also be a sign of indifference towards the new founding. Several indicators 
of performance do indeed show the marginality of the firms which have been placed in this 
mixed group. 
 
  N (Wave 1)  %  N (wave 2)  % 
Individual start-up  328 39.5 217 42.7 
Spin-out  182 21.9 144 28.3 
Individual start-up / Spin-out  208 25.1 72 14.2 
Spin-off  112 13.5 75 14.8 
Total 830  100  508 100 
Table 4.1: sizes of the start-up groups 
 
Although the literature about spin-offs is growing steadily, it is still hard to find studies 
that have measured the number of spin-offs in a region in relation to other founding types. 
However, the few studies that exist are quite consistent regarding the share of 35% (spin-
out and spin-offs), found in this study. For the province of Groningen in The Netherlands, 
the population of entrants in the year 2002 was sampled and 33% of all new firms in this 
year qualified as a spin-off (Helfrich et al., 2003). Studies by EIM (Bernardt et al., 2002) 
and Eurostat (Moncada-Paternò-Castello et al., 2000) worked with stricter definitions of 
spin-offs and, respectively, estimated 15 – 18 %
5, and 10 – 15 %
6 of all new firms to 
qualify as a spin-off. Applying the strict definition to the Groningen-study leads to a spin-
                                                         
5 For the year 2001 
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off share of 9%, which is a bit less than the share found in the EIM-study for the whole of 
The Netherlands. These figures compare quite well to the share of 13.5%
7 reported in Table 
4.1. Although these studies used different approaches and were even conducted in different 
countries, the outcomes match up quite nicely. The share of firm influence start-ups appears 
to be rather stable. 
It can be concluded that the existing stock of companies does indeed influence the 
development of new companies. However, the largest share of new firm formation activity 
can be typified as individual start-ups. 
4.2 Gestation process 
On average, spin-offs can take a longer time before coming into being. The entrepreneurs 
typically have a job during the set-up period, which makes the start of an own firm less 
pressing than for someone who is unemployed, for example. The low-pressure gestation 
period, in combination with the extra resources of the spin-off, enables the entrepreneur to 
construct a solid basis for the new firm. This should lead to a head start of spin-offs 
compared to other founding groups. Table 4.2 shows indicators of the stages of 
development the new firms are in. The significance ratings are the result of chi-square and 
ANOVA tests on the complete set of data entries, which are available from the author upon 
request. The percentages in the table represent the proportions of firms in the specific 
groups that have answered ‘YES’ to the statements in the left hand column. 
 
  Start-up  SU/SO  Spin-out  Spin-off  Significance 
Product completed  47 %  28 %  42 %  64 %  *** 
Only product idea  14 %  26 %  15 %  4 %  *** 
Started promotion  58 %  44 %  59 %  75 %  *** 
Purchased materials  74 %  64 %  74 %  69 %  * 
Purchased facilities  52 %  51 %  55 %  51 %   
Table 4.2: Scores on indicators of preparation during start-up 
Percentages are the shares of positive answers per category 
*** - α < 0.01, ** - α < 0.05, * - α < 0.1 
 
Looking at the products of the new firms, spin-offs, indeed, seem to be a step ahead of 
the other groups. About two thirds of all spin-off firms have already developed their final 
products and are in fact ready to sell to costumers. The other groups lag behind quite 
                                                         
 
7 This number relates to entrepreneurs and not necessarily to firms, like the numbers from the other 
studies. It can be assumed however that every interviewed entrepreneur is working on only one firm, 
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considerably. Spin-outs and individual start-ups have fairly similar scores, and the mixed 
group is the downward outlier. Firms that have only started thinking about the product are 
shown in the second row and form the other end of the spectrum of product development. 
The results are consistent, few spin-offs are in the ‘invention’-stage compared to the other 
groups. The χ
2-test performed gives a significant result, which means that the subsets are 
not drawn from the same population. The groups are significantly different and spin-offs 
are in a later stage of product development than other firms. This is also reflected in the 
promotional efforts of the groups. Spin-offs deploy more promotional efforts than the other 
groups. Spin-off have a product to sell and therefore need promotional activities. These 
results are in line with findings of Heirman et al. (2003), who studied new technology firms 
in Belgium. They found that entrepreneurs with extensive experience in a specific sector 
who are backed-up by venture capitalists or corporations are likely to start a firm based on a 
product idea. Although spin-offs are not defined as such in the paper, the characteristics of 
the product-oriented firms (product start-ups) match those of spin-off quite nicely. Knight 
(1988), on the other hand, finds that only 8% of all spin-off entrepreneurs based their 
companies on a specific idea for a new product. He also showed, however, that 52% based 
the company on knowledge and experience with the same products the mother company 
produced. New product ideas are probably not the first incentive to start a spin-off firm, but 
knowledge of existing products is. 
The last rows in Table 4.2 address the acquisition of materials and facilities that are 
needed for the new business. This includes everything from office supplies to the raw 
material needed to produce a product or a prototype. These items can all be regarded as 
essentials or preconditions for the operation of a firm. The differences between the groups 
are minimal. These items are evenly important to all groups and all new firms seem to be 
evenly capable of attracting supplies to start the business running. 
One year later, the situation has not changed much (Table 4.3). Spin-offs are still 
leading in terms of product development and promotion. They seem to be capable of 
retaining the head-start throughout the first year of operation. The spin-off group also 
shows the highest share of firms that have completed the gestation period and have turned 
into a full-fledged company. The low scores of the mixed group on the start-up process 
indicator hints towards the idea that this group indeed consists of relatively marginal firm 
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enough, only 1 out of 4 remaining spin-offs claims to have purchased facilities, while this 
percentage was much higher at first. A good explanation does not seem available. 
 
  Start-up SU/SO Spin-out Spin-off Significance 
Start-up process completed  35 %  17 %  31 %  43 %  ** 
Product completed  67 %  28 %  57 %  89 %  *** 
Started promotion  54 %  54 %  50 %  83 %   
Purchased materials  57 %  69 %  53 %  81 %   
Purchased facilities  64 %  46 %  50 %  25 %  ** 
Table 4.3: Scores on indicators of preparation 1 year after start-up 
Percentages are the shares of positive answers per category 
*** - α < 0.01, ** - α < 0.05, * - α < 0.1 
 
In general, spin-offs seem to be relatively quick in producing and marketing the 
product of the new firm. Besides they are able to retain their lead in development and one 
year later spin-offs are still in a further phase of development than the other firms. The 
purchase of supplies and raw materials seems to be equally difficult (or easy) for all firms. 
4.3 Performance 
Spin-offs show a lead in evolution when it comes to product development. These firms are 
closer to marketing their product and as a result, closer to receiving income. The head start 
can therefore be reflected in the performance of the firms. Performance is very difficult to 
measure and a host of suitable indicators have been suggested. In this study, three 
indicators are used: survival, employment, and income (see also Schutjens & Wever, 2000). 
These three dimensions are probably the indicators most commonly used to measure 
success. 
 
  Start-up SU/SO Spin-out Spin-off Significance 
Expectation upon start-up:         
   Odds ‘still alive in 5 year’  80 %  85 %  80 %  85 %  ** 
Situation after 1 year:         
   Operating business  35 %  17 %  31 %  43 % 
   Active start-up  29 %  38 %  33 %  18 % 
   Inactive start-up  16 %  19 %  19 %  19 % 
   Dead / other  20 %  26 %  17 %  20 % 
** 
Table 4.4: Survival 
*** - α < 0.01, ** - α < 0.05, * - α < 0.1 
 
Table 4.4 shows both the life-expectancy of firms in the gestation phase and the 
situation after one year. It becomes clear that entrepreneurs are fairly positive when starting 
a new firm. Over 80% of all entrepreneurs expects to be still in operation after five years. 
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It is well-known from previous research that survival rates are usually much lower. It is 
therefore not surprising that not all entrepreneurs can live up to their expectations. The last 
two rows indicate that, after one year, between 35% and 45% of all start-up efforts are no 
longer worked on. Again the groups show not much diversity. The share of abandoned 
start-up efforts is rather stable. As shown in Table 4.3, the success rate however differs 
quite considerably. 
Tables 4.5 and 4.6 shed some light on the second dimension of performance. They 
show the employment generated by the new firms at start-up and after one year. From the 
first two lines of Table 4.5 it becomes clear, once again, that spin-offs are ahead of the 
other new firm formation groups in terms of development. Out of all spin-offs, 24% have 
already hired employees. New firms without any specific back-up from an existing firm are 
less able to hire employees in the first stages of existence. Ambition does not account for 
these differences, because in the second row it is shown that start-ups and spin-outs are 
expecting to hire employees in the future. These entrepreneurs are just as willing to hire 
new employees, but they simply have not come around to it yet. 
  
The bottom part of Table 4.5 shows the number of employees the firms have hired, or 
expect to hire in 1 year and 5 years respectively. The table shows the average of employees 
hired for those firms that indeed have hired any. Firms without any employees are not 
included in the figures. The ANOVA-tests performed (Appendix 3) show no significant 
differences between the groups. Although not statistically significant, spin-offs do show a 
tendency to hire full-time employees instead of part-timers. Results from the ‘Groningen-
study’, mentioned earlier, point to the same direction. Helfrich et al. (2003) show that 
although the number of employees is equal for all groups, spin-offs appear to be more 
  Start-up  SU/SO  Spin-out  Spin-off  Significance 
Hired employees (% of group)  15 %  13 %  11 %  24 %  ** 
Will hire employees (% of group)  48 %  54 %  56 %  32 %  *** 
Full-time jobs now  1.83 1.52 1.89  3.27   
Part-time jobs now  1.81 1.77 1.84  1.40   
F-T jobs 1 year  3.61 5.36 4.07  5.28   
P-T jobs 1 year  2.38 2.61 2.42  3.16   
F-T jobs 5 years  10.01 15.03 20.27  18.50   
P-T jobs 5 years  6.31 9.81 6.40  9.28   
Table 4.5: Employment during start-up 
Percentages are the shares of positive answers per category 
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prepared to commit themselves by hiring more full-time employees. Individual start-ups, 
generally, favour part-time employees. The difference for employment in the earlier stages 
is not so much expressed in numbers, but rather in commitment. 
After one year the situation has changed and there is no longer a significant difference 
between the groups regarding the question whether they have hired staff or not. The 
numbers of employees however do differ at this point. Spin-offs show a higher number of 
employees than other firms. It is also interesting to see that spin-outs also have slightly 
higher employment figures than individual start-ups. At start-up the firms of these two 
groups have the same characteristics, but after one year of operation spin-outs seem to 
perform slightly better than individual start-ups. The expectations of the groups are not 
reported as they are comparable to the expectations at start-up. 
 
  Start-up  SU/SO  Spin-out  Spin-off  Significance 
Hired employees (% of group)  20 %  29 %  17 %  24 %   
Will hire employees (% of group)  38 %  46 %  41 %  32 %   
F-T jobs now  1.84 0.33 2.26  6.71  ** 
P-T jobs now  1.64 1.42 3.38  4.67  * 
Table 4.6: Employment 1 year after start-up 
Percentages are the shares of positive answers per category 
*** - α < 0.01, ** - α < 0.05, * - α < 0.1 
 
Table 4.7 shows the scores per group for other indicators of success, income being the 
most obvious of these. Once again, spin-offs outperform the other start-up groups; 54% of 
all new spin-off companies have already received income. Start-ups and spin-out lag 
behind, and the mixed group is again the downward outlier. The levels of expected income 
after the first and fifth year, however, are not significantly different. This shows that the 
motivation and goals are equal. Receiving income seems to be linked directly to the stage 
of product development the new firms are in. Firms need a complete product before 
receiving any income. As is shown in Tables 4.2 and 4.3, spin-offs are leading the other 
founding groups in terms of product development, which can account for their superior 
income levels. In contrast, many firms in the SU/SO-group are still working on the 
development of their final product. Consequently, many of these firms have not received 
any income yet. The same line of reasoning applies for start-ups and spin-outs, which form 
the middle-groups for both indicators. Although logical in terms of internal coherence of 
the study, these results do not make sense theoretically. There is no obvious reason why the 
SU/SO-group should differ from start-ups and spin-outs. Assuming that start-ups and spin-









    Paper Porto 3.2 - longitudinaal 
SPIN-OFF FIRMS AND INDIVIDUAL START-UPS 
 
be in between, or at least close to, start-ups and spin-outs. However, this group seems to 
perform worse on most of the indicators. A lack of interest in both the ERC-questionnaire 
and the firm could account for the low scores. 
Receiving income does not guarantee a positive monthly balance. The χ
2-test indicates 
no significant differences between the groups, and, at first glance, the figures even suggest 
less profit for spin-offs. Apparently spin-offs have to cope with higher costs, which 
counterbalance the income received. The extra marketing activities of spin-offs, reported in 
Table 4.2, support this idea. 
 
  Start-up  SU/SO  Spin-out  Spin-off  Significance 
Received income (% yes)  44 %  27 %  42 %  54 %  *** 
Expected income 1
st year ($1000)  506 297 452 1002   
Expected income 5
th year ($1000)  1843 2635 1775  2309   
Company is making monthly profit  33 %  36 %  40 %  24 %   
% Sales to largest 3 customers  35 %  40 %  29 %  38 %  * 
Table 4.7: Indicators of success during start-up 
Percentages are the shares of positive answers per category 
*** - α < 0.01, ** - α < 0.05, * - α < 0.1 
 
In the long run, being dependent on a small number of customers negatively influences 
the survival chance of a company (LaBahn, 1998; Kalwani & Narayandas, 1995). Although 
this indicator is not directly related to the present success of a firm, it does show its 
vulnerability and chances of success in the future. Especially in this study the percentage of 
sales to the three largest customers is interesting, while spin-offs, and to a lesser extent 
spin-outs, have established connections with existing firms. These types of new firm 
formation may be prone to a ‘monorelationship’, because the links between the new firm 
and the mother company are already in place and relatively easy to maintain. This idea is 
not supported by the results in Table 4.7. The scores are close to each other; about 35 % to 
40 % of all sales are to the largest customers. Spin-outs have a somewhat lower percentage, 
which could indicate the ability of these entrepreneurs to combine the benefits of good 
knowledge of the relevant networks (i.e. customers) and individual entrepreneurship. Spin-
off entrepreneurs also have the knowledge of network, but it may be harder for them to 
break the links with the mother company. 
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  Start-up  SU/SO  Spin-out  Spin-off  Significance 
Received income (% yes)  53 %  39 %  68 %  81 %  ** 
Company is making monthly profit  55 %  28 %  55 %  59 %   
Income 1
st year ($1000)  132 83 393 167  ** 
% Sales to largest 3 customers  48 %  59 %  38 %  30 %  ** 
Table 4.8: Indicators of success 1 year after start-up 
Percentages are the shares of positive answers per category 
*** - α < 0.01, ** - α < 0.05, * - α < 0.1 
 
After one year, again the situation has not changed much. Spin-offs are still leading the 
other start-ups. Both income and dependency level are better compared to the other groups. 
Again the rise of the spin-out group is noticeable as they outperform individual start-ups 
regarding both income and dependency. Spin-outs even show the highest average income. 
However, the average is biased because of several high outliers (even after correction for 
the most severe cases). 
5. CONCLUSION 
This paper compared spin-offs to spin-outs and individual start-ups. Based on theoretical 
ideas, stemming from the resource-based view of the firm, spin-offs are assumed to 
outperform individual start-ups based on their superior capabilities to mobilise resources 
and find their way in the relevant business networks. This notion has been confirmed in 
several studies, using rather small samples of spin-offs and other companies (Bernardt et 
al., 2002; Shrader & Simon, 1997; Dahl et al., 2003). This paper, using the large ERC 
dataset, also supports the general idea that firm-supported start-ups (spin-offs) will 
outperform other founding types, both at the point of start-up and one year later. Spin-offs 
score best on product development, employment figures, and income. Theoretically also 
spin-outs are expected to perform better than individual start-ups as they have specific 
knowledge about the product and the market the new firm will be operating in. However, 
when at the verge of starting the firm, spin-outs do not do not distinguish themselves from 
other entrepreneurs. Spin-outs perform just as good (or bad) as individual start-ups. Only 
after one year do spin-outs slightly come to the forefront.  
  The key to a successful start-up seems to be in the close ties between a mother 
company and its offspring. The lack of support during start-up (that spin-offs do receive) 
hold back individual start-ups and spin-outs. Spin-outs later on compensate this with the 
specific knowledge they possess. This line of reasoning is in corresponds with the resource-
based theory which predicts firms with good access to relevant resources to outperform 
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fact that a firm is a spin-off really boosts the performance of this firm. Further research is 
necessary in order to test the ideas expressed in this paper. 
Although successful, spin-offs, can not be seen as a panacea for economic development 
problems. Despite the fact that this paper shows that spin-offs are a step ahead of their 
opponents in the first phases of their development, the effects in the long-run remain 
unclear. It all depends on the ability of the other firms to catch up with the superior utilised 
spin-offs. Besides, it is still important to realise that the individual start-up is still the 
predominant form of entry and this will probably not change. Firms can only support new 
firms to a certain extent, and individual action will remain the most important drive behind 
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7. APPENDIX  1 




Autonsu = NO OUTSIDE INFLUENCE ∧  Q331 = NO 
The entrepreneur started a new firm without any outside influence and was not 
employed before starting the new firm. 
 
Autonsu = NO OUTSIDE INFLUENCE ∧  Q331 = YES ∧  Qa5b = NO ∧  Qa5h = NO 
The entrepreneur started a new firm without any outside influence and was employed 
before starting the new firm. The new firm however was not based on experiences or 
knowledge of specific technologies from previous employment. 
 
Start-up / Spin-out: 
Autonsu = NO OUTSIDE INFLUENCE ∧  Q331 = YES ∧  Qa5b = N/A ∧  Qa5h = N/A 
The entrepreneur started a new firm without any outside influence and was employed 
before starting the new firm. There is no information on experiences or knowledge of 




Autonsu = NO OUTSIDE INFLUENCE ∧  Q331 = YES ∧  (Qa5b = YES ∨  Qa5h = YES) 
The entrepreneur started a new firm without any outside influence and was employed 
before starting the new firm. The new firm is based on experiences or knowledge of 
specific technologies from previous employment. 
 
Spin-off: 
Autonsu ≠  NO OUTSIDE INFLUENCE 
The entrepreneur started a new firm with outside influence. 